Chapter Twenty-One: Conclusion


"…Bishop Dupre … is not an evil man. He is being forced, I believe, to do evil things…"


[Scahill Deposition, Oct. 29, 2003]


Separating the sinner from the sin is just as important today as it was in late 2003, when the sexual abuse crisis in the Diocese of Springfield was coming to a head. We want to believe that people, including bishops, can change. But, when mistakes are made, there is a thirst for justice which can only be slaked by a day of reckoning. We need to ask: how much has really changed, over the last six years or so?

On its face, the $8.5 million settlement is an attempt to settle, once and for all, sixty year's worth of claims leveled against the personnel of the Diocese of Springfield. "Settle" means to fix or resolve conclusively. This suggests finality, if not an outright absolution. So, does the settlement fit this definition?

I believe it does, in the legal sense. There are unlikely to be further court proceedings from the 46 who settled in 2004, or the 59 who settled in 2008. And, if the claims against employees are resolved, any reservations about supervisors become moot, because there is no one to press the claims and no way to prove them.

However, there's an aspect which I believe the settlements do not address. And that, perhaps surprisingly, is the moral one.

The Diocese would like us to believe that this satisfactory conclusion in the legal arena carries with it a moral stamp of approval. And we know this from their press releases and editorials. For example, on July 2, 2008, Attorney John Egan claimed that the settlement proved the innocence of the Diocese, once and for all. A church editorial on July 11 asserted that mediation was the best available method to achieve justice.

Again, on Nov. 27, when the arbitration awards were finalized, Egan stated that full participation was a tribute to the fairness of the process. And, Bishop McDonnell said that the diocese reached out to victims from a sense of moral responsibility. Clearly, the settlement is believed by the Diocese to carry highly moral overtones.

I disagree with these assessments because I don't think they are supported by the facts. Two themes stand out: policy, and money.

From the beginning, the policy of the Springfield Diocese toward sexual abuse allegations has not been shaped by justice, fairness, or a sense of responsibility. The policy has been to avoid them, to flee them, and when cornered, to fight them. A review of the record (close to 100 news articles and over 100 legal papers over the last 10 years or so) shows this without question.

The subtext of the church's declarations is that since the victims have what they want – money – the problem is solved. But, when you look at what victims actually asked for, you find that money was the least of it.

Instead, they wanted compassion and understanding. They wanted the perpetrators removed from our midst, quickly. Accountability to this degree never happened, and it remains elusive. The implications of this failure are not clear. But, it is clear that we cannot ignore it.

As we've discussed, the Diocese of Springfield is really two things. The canonical one is a particular church founded in 1870, and the legal one is a corporation sole created in 1898. This composite is not easily described. Every analogy falls short, but this one conveys some truth:

For convenience and protection, the Diocese of Springfield wears a suit of armor (corporation sole). But, the canonical Diocese of Springfield is the beating heart within the body.

The pre-trial hearings of the insurance dispute confirmed beyond any question that church officials must uphold the law of the land while operating under corporation sole. They are not allowed a pass. This gives us a starting point for the difference between the canonical Diocese and the legal one.

But, this very distinction raises concerns: If the civil Diocese, the legal one, has been found accountable – judged to have a moral duty to our fellow citizens – can the canonical Diocese be any less moral than the legal Diocese? Aren't we, the body of Christ and the communion of saints, supposed to reach higher than the civil standard?

Maybe past bishops and their legal advisers put all the eggs into the corporation sole basket with the firm moral conviction that it was the best way to serve the canonical Diocese. One can agree that self-preservation is a powerful and often legitimate motive. But, the legal strategy that works to protect the civil corporation should never be allowed to work against pastoral responsibilities.

When I began this study, I said that "…even when the interests of civil and religious society seem most opposed, the hope and belief is that they can yet be reconciled..…" I still think that. But, I have to admit that I am sobered by the Diocesan attitudes I have identified, and the challenge ahead.

For example, laity and clergy are supposed to be part of the same body and the same family. And yet, chancery officials have never bothered to explain their legal strategy to the laity, much less ask for advice, despite ample opportunity to do so. I find this insensitive, to say the least.

The laity are the loyal faithful who make all the good works of the Diocese possible. What could be more important than consulting with us, and confirming and explaining what the official Diocese is up to?

It seems clear from this study that church officials in Springfield do not encourage expression of ideas within the church. If they did, we would have seen a lively debate about these critical settlement issues in both church and public forums, instead of a moral vacuum in which individual voices (whether from priest or laity) are systematically stifled. From the evidence, the Diocese of Springfield does not just dislike free speech; it hates and fears it.

These ideas are so far from the ideals of Catholicism, and so far tilted toward an unhealthy and outmoded centralization doctrine, that I doubt even Bishop McDonnell would defend them. And yet, it seems from his action (or rather, from his inaction) that he considers control to be more important than communion.

Many more stumbling blocks come from Attorney Egan. He's still fighting the court case, except that the litigation has moved to the court of public opinion. He continues to misrepresent the facts of the case. This may be a justifiable, and even a winning strategy in court. However, in the canonical and moral sense, it is a grave failing. The Diocese deserves better.

We need to solve these problems, because we need to restore the beating heart to the place of honor.


-- the end --

Chapter Twenty: The Top Five Recommendations

5. The Diocesan law firm of Egan, Flanagan & Cohen should be replaced.

4. Throw away the Diocesan Playbook which enthrones corporation sole above all else. The Diocese should abandon corporation sole and move toward a federation of individually incorporated parishes and institutions.

3. The Catholic Observer should apologize for its slanted coverage about the settlement to the parishioners and to the Catholic Press Association. It should embrace professional journalism with a renewed commitment to the truth.

2. First, the Diocese should award the latest round of victims additional money to achieve parity with the victims of the first round.

Then, non-monetary demands for victim's rights should be embraced by Bishop McDonnell, especially:

a. - The Bishop should announce that he will not enforce the confidentiality provisions of any prior agreement with a sexual abuse claimant who now or in the future desires to make his/her claim public.

b. - Diocesan representatives should not refer to plaintiffs or other tort claimants and their claims as “alleged” victims, “alleged” survivors, or “alleged” claims.

c. - A list of credibly accused priests who worked in the Diocese should be placed on the Diocesan web site and kept there.

d. - The Bishop should publicize laicization procedures, and publish information about the following defrocked priests of the Diocese: Ronald Malboeuf, Richard Lavigne, Richard Meehan, Alfred Graves, and Edward Kennedy.

e. - The Bishop should disclose specific supervision and support plans for each credibly accused priest to assure safety in neighborhoods where these priests are living. (SNAP estimates that there are roughly a dozen such men living throughout the diocese among unsuspecting neighbors and getting little or no supervision.)

f. - The Bishop should publicly support statute of limitation reform by CORSAL, or explain why he believes it is not worthy of support.

g. - Diocesan financial reform should include:

1. yearly net worth statements in addition to operating budget statements
2. openness and transparency about payments to Bishop Dupre
3. openness and transparency about the "Clergy on Involuntary Leave" category
4. openness and transparency about the "Child Protection" category; for example, Bishop McDonnell should explain why he feels that payments to lawyers and payments for civil settlement costs qualify as "Child Protection"

and...........

1. Bishop McDonnell should establish a truth commission to end the silence about Bishop Thomas Dupre and work toward his rehabilitation within the Christian community.

Chapter Nineteen: Q & A, Revisited

(these Q & A are taken from the July 11 article in the Catholic Observer; Mr. Egan's comments are in italics)

Q. (C. O.) Why did the Springfield Diocese sue its insurance companies?
A. (Egan) …..after the 2004 settlement was announced, new claimants came forward. The diocese was unable to proceed to resolve these claims until its dispute with the insurance carriers was resolved.

The claimants that Egan refers to were 20 in number but they were not new. All were pending when the $7.75 million settlement for the 46 consolidated claims under Attorney Stobierski was announced, see Springfield Republican of Aug. 17, 2004. It's never been explained why the consolidated claims were honored but not the others. The leftover claims grew to 30 by the time of the insurance suit in June of 2005, and to 61 by the time of the 2008 settlement. Bishop McDonnell was not unable to settle the leftover claims, but he was unwilling. There is a difference.

The Diocese, like many corporations, has funds for a rainy day. On Nov. 15, a portfolio of $30 million was referenced in a story in the Springfield Republican. Almost certainly, far more is available. We don't know the true amount of Diocesan assets because it's hidden from the laity.

Q. (C. O.) What happened in the lawsuit?
A. (Egan) The insurance carriers investigated all the pertinent records of the diocese (80,000 pages) and took sworn testimony of multiple diocesan officials and witnesses outside the diocese. The diocese took sworn testimony from representatives of each insurance carrier. This "discovery" process took several years. At the same time, a Hampden County Grand Jury was reviewing the same records and taking testimony under oath from officials of the diocese.
On Sept. 27, 2004, the District Attorney announced that the grand jury had completed its investigation and found no evidence of knowledge of sexual abuse, no evidence of destroyed records, or a cover-up on the part of the diocese..….

Most of these statements are not true or amount to fact-fudging.

The claim is made that 80,000 pages were examined by the insurers', but nowhere does this figure appear in the court papers. But, the figure of 80,000 often appears in accounts of the 2004 grand jury investigation of Bishop Dupre. Egan often conflates them, though the number of papers, objectives, timing and personnel of the investigations are different. The insurance trial did not begin until June of 2005, some 9 months after the grand jury inquiry had ended.

The 2004 grand jury did not absolve the Diocese, as Egan claims, because that was not their function. Their charge was to gather evidence against Dupre. They found enough evidence to charge Dupre with 2 counts of child rape. The DA said that they did not find chargeable evidence that Dupre had personally destroyed documents, obstructed justice, or tampered with witnesses – but said nothing about the Diocese.

It is a marvel that Attorney Egan still doesn't get it. The Washington Post, the AP, the Boston Globe and the Springfield Republican all reported that the conclusions of the grand jury related to Dupre, not the Diocese.

Q. (C. O.) Why did the diocese settle for less than it paid?
A. (Egan)… one of our major carriers was insolvent…..the diocese, out of concern for the victims, agree to waive the charitable immunity cap of $20,000 and not assert any statute of limitation or other legal defenses. This was a pastoral decision made by the bishop, and the insurance carriers were not bound by it. Finally, by settling now, the diocese was able to spare the claimants from undergoing depositions conducted by the insurance company lawyers.

These statements are not true. They imply that the Diocese was giving away the store for altruistic reasons — which was hardly the case.

Home Insurance Co. was declared insolvent in June of 2003. The Diocesan response at the time was to petition the court to delay five lawsuits. Soon, the MIIF (Massachusetts Insurance Insolvency Fund, a state agency) stepped in to cover the liabilities of Home. The Home insolvency was a complicating factor, but not for the reason that Egan suggests. The MIIF proved to be an especially tough negotiator during pre-trial hearings.

During the trial, additional carriers became liable. Three long-forgotten policies turned up during the discovery process. Two of these policies (from American Home Assurance Co. and National Union Fire Insurance Co.) were ordered by the judge to 'drop down' to provide primary coverage on Feb. 11, 2008. Thus, at the time of settlement there were at least five companies liable for damages. There is no connection between the ability of the carriers to pay and the decision by the Diocese to settle for less than it paid out.

The concessions referred to (suspension of SOL, waiving charitable immunity, etc.) were not pastoral decisions, but rather carefully crafted deals. The limit on charitable immunity is $20,000, a measly sum under the circumstances, and the victims wisely pushed to have this threshold set aside for the more egregious cases. The SOL suspensions were part of the tolling agreements dating from January of 2005. The tolling agreements permitted the second wave of victims and the Diocese to set their arguments aside while the insurance trial was being fought. In return for suspending the ticking clock of the SOL, the Diocese got to remove their name from the lawsuits (leaving the names of the accused priests) and got a respite from the pending claims.

The tolling agreements bought time for the victims. Without them, their claims would have lapsed during the three-year trial. The Massachusetts SOL is three years from the time that victims realizes their injuries can be traced to past abuse.

The SOL defense has nothing to do with the amounts of the awards for the second wave of victims, since the Diocese had already waived it. If the Diocese paid awards during the first wave to those whose SOL rights had run out, that might qualify as "pastoral".

But, the Diocese negated that possibility by demanding the full reimbursement of $7.75 million, plus court costs, throughout the trial. See Paper 111.1. If the "pastoral decision" referred to by Mr. Egan was forced by the terms of the settlement, then it cannot be considered either pastoral or a decision.

Egan expresses great compassion and solidarity with the victims, but these attitudes are suspect. During the trial, the Diocese and the victims were often opposed. For example, the victims opposed the "protective order", a key Diocesan strategy. They also opposed the Diocesan petition to have impounded documents (the "laicization documents) from the 2004 grand jury favorable to the Diocese allowed into testimony (though not into the public record). See Paper 89, pg. 11. In these matters the victims supported the insurers' lawyers, not those of the Diocese.

The statement about depositions is not true. The deposition of victims by insurance lawyers was prohibited by the Scheduling Order for Discovery (Paper 63), about a year into the suit. It remained a bargaining chip and was subsequently mentioned by the insurance lawyers. However, in Paper 111.1, we learn that the insurers have agreed to skip depositions, in exchange for written information.

It was Attorney John Stobierski, lawyer for the claimants, who successfully resisted attempts to reintroduce victim depositions, not Attorney Egan. See the Springfield Republican of Oct. 26, 2007, when an announcement was made about the final agreement to substitute written questions for the depositions. The Diocese demanded the full $7.75 million reimbursement, plus attorney's fees, throughout the trial, and yet caved at the last minute for a reimbursement of $3.5 million. The Diocese (and Mr. Egan) have yet to explain why they settled for $4.25 million less.


Q. (C. O.) Where will the settlement proceeds go?
A. (Egan)  …..claimants will be offered an arbitration process, which will permit recovering between $5,000 and $200,000 as determined by Commonwealth Mediation…..those who elect not to go into arbitration will be free to pursue their legal claims in a court of law, and the diocese will defend those claims with any lawful defense.

Nowhere in these answers do we learn that the amounts for the "process" were determined by Bishop McDonnell. The insurance companies provided reimbursement, and the mediation service provided distribution. Mr. Egan is hiding the fact that McDonnell lowballed the victims.

After the dust settled, the average award of the second wave was $76,000. The average award for the first wave of victims had been $168,478. By the way, the average award for a settlement of this type throughout the US is close to one million dollars. Although $5 million was allocated for the second wave, the mediation service held the awards to $4.5 million – so the remaining $.5 million went to the Diocese. Confidentiality agreements prevent us from knowing more about the process.

Egan's statements show how the settlement game is played. Those who opt into the process gain the money, but lose their right to sue. Those who don't participate lose the money, but retain their right to sue. This proves that the Diocese never gave up its legal defenses, unless it got something in return. Church officials made their decisions based on cutting their losses. In other words, they displayed typical corporate behavior.


Q. (C. O.) Why do you think the insurance carriers settled now?
A. (Egan) ….. in my judgment, the carriers came to the same conclusion as the grand jury: that this terrible abuse was done in secret, and that the victims were coerced by their abusers to keep the abuse secret for years….

This is grandstanding. Mr. Egan continues to argue the case here that he lost in court, except that now, confidentiality agreements are in place.

It's convenient for Mr. Egan to say that the insurers were converted to the same viewpoints that Mr. Egan holds, now that they cannot answer back. But, throughout the three-year trial, the carriers never gave a sign that they accepted Diocesan claims.

It's equally convenient for him to pretend that the conclusions of the grand jury mirror his own, now that they have disbanded. But, the record shows that the grand jury come to no conclusions about the Diocesan role in sexual abuse. Their charge was to examine the actions of Dupre, not the Diocese.

_____

If we apply the Diocesan Playbook to Mr. Egan's Q & A, we find that the Diocese claims they were forced into the settlement (a decision made by not making a decision). Although Mr. Egan avoids responsibility by claiming"pastoral decisions", it's hard to find decisions that are not forced or strategic.

Even after a loss of $4.25 million, church officials try to hide the reasons for the loss. They also withhold information by insisting on confidentiality agreements to protect themselves, even though the Dallas Norms specifically called for an end to such measures.

The Diocese does not apologize for lowballing the victims, or for its past behavior as employer, or for maintaining its secrecy. On the contrary, it loudly proclaims its innocence, despite considerable evidence to the contrary.

The shortfall of $4.25 million strongly suggests that the Diocese was indeed negligent – and that a trial would have made this plain.

Chapter Eighteen: The Top Ten Lessons

10. The Diocese cannot assert privacy and due process rights on behalf of priests - only the priests can do that.

9. The Diocese has a normal employer-employee relationship with priests.

8. Representatives of the state can't interfere with church decision-making - but, they may examine it.

7. If the Diocese wants to protect secret documents in a court of law, they must show why this is necessary.

6. "Corporation sole" exposes the assets of parishes to the claims of creditors of the Diocese – and vice versa.

5. Under civil law, the Springfield Diocese is a corporation - it is not a subsidiary of a larger group.

4. The Diocese has ignored Dallas Norms 3 and 7 about confidentiality agreements and open and transparent communication.

3. The Catholic Observer has consistently misrepresented the truth of the settlement to the parishioners of the Diocese.

2. The Diocesan law firm of Egan, Flanagan & Cohen should be replaced because they have placed secrecy above justice, and..............

1. The number one lesson of the settlement is that the purpose of the church, which is the salvation of souls, has been severely compromised by the conduct of Diocesan leaders during the $8.5 million settlement.

_______________________________________________


10. The Diocese cannot assert privacy and due process rights on behalf of priests – only the priests can do that.

See: Paper 69, pg. 22, Paper 77, pg. 9.

The Insurers' argued two points: that the Diocese was not a person, and therefore could not uphold the rights of the priest; and, that the heinous nature of the allegations overrode a nominal right to privacy. They were upheld.
In Paper 77 the judge did not address the question directly, but answered it under the "psychotherapy-patient" privilege that the Diocese was also trying to assert. He ruled that the Diocese was not the patient, and therefore could not assert privacy rights of the priest on his behalf.
I find this decision important because the vow of obedience is sometimes used as a cover for inaction. The laity have a right to wonder, why are priests so quiet? Why have they not broken ranks with bishops, even when their own rights have been trampled?
It is past time for priests to assert their rights to due process and to their own opinions. They have baptismal rights and civil rights that are just as important as the desires of the bishops for a compliant work force.
_____
9. The Diocese has a normal employer-employee relationship with priests.

See Paper 62, pg. 5, Paper 73, (not paginated), pp. 7-8, Paper 77, pg. 5.

The Diocesan arguments that somehow priests were the equivalent of "super-employees" not subject to civil law did not hold water. Those in pp. 7-8 of Paper 73 are particularly lame. They plead for an exception, without showing any validity for an exception. The judge wisely held the Diocese to the same minimum standards that any corporation has toward its employees.
It's probably true, as church officials sometimes claim, that the incidence of sexual abuse among clergy is not much different than among bank tellers, or stock brokers, or teachers. But, the difference is that banks, stock exchanges and schools did not systematically protect their employees from the consequences of their actions, and the Roman Catholic Church, including the Diocese of Springfield, did. Also, children regularly conflate religious leaders with God; an entirely different dynamic that that at play in public schools.
To this day, there has been no bishop who has been disciplined – in any way, shape, or form – as a result of the crisis.
_____
8. Representatives of the state can't interfere with church decision-making - but, they may examine it.

See Paper 77, pg. 6.

The Diocese claimed, using many of the arguments of the Talbot case, that an examination of church decision-making during the discovery process would directly interfere with religious belief and thus have a "chilling" effect on it. The judge thought not. He wrote that the mere examination of decision-making did not have much to do with what the church thought or did.
Instead, he found that the examination of chancery papers, especially the personnel files of priests, was an acceptable way for the defendants to find out "…when and what the Diocese knew about the sexual abuse claims in order to bolster their defense…"
The appeal judge agreed. She quotes from precedent (Society of Jesus of New England v. Commonwealth, 441 Mass., 668) in denying the claim: "The mere examination of the [Diocese's laicization] documents…does not infringe on the [Diocese's] autonomous decision-making with respect to [its priests'] fitness, discipline, assignments, or any other aspect of [their] relationship with the [Diocese]."

_____
7. If the Diocese wants to protect secret documents in a court of law, they must show why this is necessary.

See Paper 77 (Judge Agostini's decision) and Paper 89 (Judge Duffly's affirmation), and Paper 86 (rejection of protective order).

The laicization files were those most bitterly fought over. This consisted of at least five large files (Ronald Malboeuf, Richard Lavigne, Richard Meehan, Alfred Graves, and Edward Kennedy), and perhaps more. I suspect that somewhere in these files there was a smoking gun that explains the reduction of the reimbursement from 7.75 million to 3.5, or, at the least, had a substantial effect on the reduction.
But, there were many types of documents that the Diocese sought to protect. Sometimes, this was allowed, as in the work-product and attorney-privilege issues. Perhaps its revealing that the closer the documents got to secular correspondence, like attorney-client, the more likely they were to gain protection.
The frantic attempt at a "protective order" after the laicization documents were ordered to be produced was probably doomed from the start. It was deemed an "impoundment order dressed as a protective order" by the motion judge and fared no better when the Diocese addressed a petition to the appeal judge, who found the petition a "…collateral attack on the trial court's denial of its motion…" for the protective order.
The Diocese had no luck in convincing judges that its privacy rights were more important than the victim's rights to be safe from harm.
The appeals judge, quoting from the Leary v. Geoghan decision, wrote that "In view of the legitimate public interest in the issue of sexual abuse of minors by priests, it is difficult to '…conjure up an argument that would persuade a reasonable person that many of the issues raised in these cases and their underlying discovery documents do not lend themselves to public scrutiny…'"

_____
6. "Corporation sole" exposes the assets of parishes to the claims of creditors of the Diocese – and vice versa.

I have argued elsewhere that the number one priority for the Diocese is: protect corporation sole (see Chapter Seventeen: The Diocesan Playbook). This priority explains their legal strategy, including the insurance trial, better than anything else. And yet, the way that corporation sole works is not widely known, even within the church.
The defense that individual weekly donations to the parishes have nothing to do with the costs of the insurance settlement has been a persistent theme of church officials. Likewise, the "central funds" in Springfield are said to differ from other pots of money. And, it is said that "all of the settlement costs are paid for from insurance". Yet, these assertions are easily discredited.
A research paper explains that under corporation sole there is really only one pot. See: The Bishop's Alter Ego", by Bainbridge and Cole, UCLA, online at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=901663
Under corporation sole, the assets and liabilities of the parishes and other units of the diocese become inextricably linked. On pg. 13 we find that:

…The Church, as a matter of doctrine and canon law, is composed of numerous united but distinct entities, subject in varying ways and degrees to ecclesiastical control. Each separate entity possesses rights (including rights of ownership) that are enforceable, under church law, against the other entities. The assets of the Catholic Church, under canon law, thus do not belong to a single owner. Instead, Church assets “belong to many owners: the Apostolic See, individual dioceses, institutes of consecrated life, societies of apostolic life, parishes, other public juridic persons, private juridic persons, and natural persons individually and in association.” Accordingly, centralization of “ownership and control of all church property within a diocese is contrary to the law of the Church. ”, according to the New Commentary On The Code Of Canon Law by Beal, et al., 2000.


And on pg. 14:

" ...First, and most crucially, it is impossible to square the use of the corporation sole with canon law… incorporation as a corporation sole exposes the assets of parishes and other juridic persons, which in canon law are the property of such persons, to the claims of creditors of the diocese….conversely, by centralizing civil ownership in a single entity, the corporation sole also exposes '…all parochial and other church related assets within a diocese to satisfy creditors’ claims against any individual parish or institution.'”

The last part of this quote is from pg. 1457 of the "New Commentary on Canon Law" (2000) by Beal and others, a standard guide to interpreting canon law.
In view of this, any bishop would have a hard time keeping the diocese together under the threat of millions of dollars of liability, which is one way to look at the sexual abuse crisis. The fear of trial by jury is probably what led Dupre and other bishops to prefer mediation and settlements. Settlements always result in less cost to the diocese. Other advantages are the preservation of secrecy and the appearance of propriety.

The true cost of the settlement is therefore a matter of concern to all parishioners, not just chancery accountants. Much of it is not covered by insurance. The Diocese expended $7.75 million for the first round of victims in 2004, an average of 168,478 per victim, and got reimbursed 3.5 million in 2008, after the bruising 3-year insurance trial, leaving a loss of 4.25 million.

The next thing to happen was that 5 million of the insurance settlement (remember, the total settlement was 8.5 million) was earmarked for the second round of victims.  But, for reasons that have not been explained, only 4.5 million went to the 59 victims, an average settlement amount of 77,203. The other .5 million was put into the chancery treasury.

If we take the .5 million as a credit, then the loss of 4.25 million comes down to 3.75 million.

To this loss must be added the lawyers' fees specific to the settlement, found under "Child Protection" in annual reports:

Civil and Canonical Fees

2004     354,948
2005     209,328
2006     101,616
2007     229,000
2008     366,218
2009     161,013

subtotal 1,422,123

The 2004 diocesan report by Laura Reilly included these figures for Jan. 2004 - Jan. 2005:

payment for priests counseling 112,452
payment for victims counseling 145,470
subtotal     257,922

Also, there was an initial grant for future counseling to Behavioral Health Network in 2004 of $50,000. It is not known if this is a recurring annual expense.

totals: 3,750,000 + 1,422,123 + 257,922 + 50,000 = $5,480,045.00

Thus, the unreimbursed cost to the Diocese of the sexual abuse crisis, so far, is nearly $5.5 million.

This is a conservative figure because it does not include the first settlement for 17 victims of Richard Lavigne in 1993, confidential settlements that have not been disclosed, benefits for Bishop Dupre, and the "clergy on involuntary leave" category of the annual report.

This last item was $676,705 for the period 2004-2007, 135,686 for FY2008, and 120,433 for FY2009.

When the total of this last category (932,824) is added in, and the continual counseling for both priests and victims since 2004 or so, and the support for Dupre, which as far as I know appears nowhere,  it is quite clear that the monetary cost must be at least 10 million and is very likely far greater.
_____
5. Under civil law, the Springfield Diocese is a corporation - it is not a subsidiary of a larger group.

See Paper 62, pp. 5, 6, Paper 77, pg. 7.

The Diocese pretends that the canonical Diocese (the one sanctioned by Rome in 1870) and the legal Diocese (created by the laws of Massachusetts in 1898) are the same, and tries to exploit their combined rights in pursuing its objectives.
The insurance trial found a narrower role. The judge ruled in Paper 62 that the Diocese of Springfield is not a subsidiary of a larger group (the Church of Rome). In Paper 77, addressing the privacy area, he held that " …privacy mandates by ecclesiastical authorities are not, standing alone, binding on this court."
Instead, he found that the Diocese was a corporation subject to the laws of Massachusetts. This ruling undercut the "alter ego", trade association, and subsidiary/corporation analogies put forth by Diocesan lawyers.
The judge said that "…nothing in the record supports an inference that the dioceses stand in an organizational relationship to each other such that one diocese's liabilities directly affect those of the other dioceses, in contrast to the relationship between parent and subsidiary companies…"
The Diocese is accountable to U. S. citizens through civil law. It is also accountable to both parishioners and the Vatican through canon law. The affiliation with Rome, though true theologically, cannot be used by a Diocese to cover up criminal activity, or to encroach where it should not be.
This was a good ruling because it reinforces that the Diocese is accountable for its actions.
_____
4. The Diocese has ignored Dallas Norms 3 and 7 about confidentiality agreements and open and transparent communication.

Stories of the survivors have not appeared in the press in the wake of the settlement, and there is only one reason I can think of: that such truth-telling is prohibited in confidentiality agreements that Diocesan lawyers forced on the victims as a condition of settlement.
It is remarkable how little coverage of the settlement has appeared in the Catholic Observer, the official newspaper of the diocese. It falls far short of what was supposed to happen, according to the Dallas Norms.
Shortly after the 2004 settlement, Stobierski commented: "The Dallas norms set forth the fact that these settlements will not be done in secret any longer. To that end, my clients want the names of priests who allegedly abused them made public".

ARTICLE 3. Dioceses… will not enter into confidentiality agreements except for grave and substantial reasons brought forward by the victim/survivor and noted in the text of the agreement.
ARTICLE 7. Each diocese… will develop a communications policy that reflects a commitment to transparency and openness. Within the confines of respect for the privacy and the reputation of the individuals involved, dioceses… will deal as openly as possible with members of the community.

Openness and transparency across the board is called for. And yet, if you go to the Diocesan web site right now (www.diospringfield.org) you will find nothing about the settlement. It is as if it had never happened. It's clear that publishing a list of credibly accused priests is just about the last thing on the mind of Springfield officials. In fact, they claim it is illegal, though the Archdiocese of Chicago seems to be able to pull it off.

But, since this type of disclosure is certainly encouraged, if not mandated, by the Dallas Norms, why did the Diocese not follow suit, and publish such a list in 2004? Why did no information about the 2004 settlement get posted and remain on their web site? And why has the Diocese not used their web site to publish information about the 2008 settlement, and list the accused priests?

Sometimes it's hard to demonstrate why confidentiality agreements are so important. Don't the victims deserve privacy? Certainly they do, as much as they want and need. But, we need to remember that the claimants were not the parties. It was the Diocese that sued the insurance carriers. The Diocese and the insurers fought it out over who should pay, leaving us with a cash settlement that will resolve the legal claims of the victims.

But, masking the terms under which the legal fight was resolved has nothing to do with the privacy of the victims. On the contrary, it has everything to do with the privacy of the Diocese and its insurers - both of whom should be reporting to parishioners.

The problem is, once the suit is settled, it's not easy to know how and under what conditions it got settled. This is why the Dallas Norms stipulated that confidentiality agreements in settlements should be confined to protecting the victims, and not used to protect bishops and institutions. Unfortunately, management at the Diocese of Springfield has apparently chosen to do that very thing. One of the 59 claimants of the 2008 settlement has confirmed that the confidentiality agreements that all were forced to sign amounted to no less than 16 pages.
_____
3. The Catholic Observer has consistently misrepresented the truth of the settlement to the parishioners of the Diocese.

A regular reader of the Catholic Observer or a visitor to the Diocesan web site will find virtually no trace of the scandal that has consumed over 14 million dollars, 5.5 million of it unreimbursed; and, that amount can easily be doubled when the following items are factored in: civil and canonical fees for lawyers relating directly to the scandal; financial support for "clergy on involuntary leave"; other confidential settlements such as those paid to the Blanchard victims and to the Croteau brothers; and counseling fees for both victims and priests.

The fallout includes well over 50 credibly accused priests, more than 100 victims, a time span back to the Eisenhower era, and yet – it is as if it had never happened. For example, there is more information about Richard Lavigne on the Chicopee Police Department web site than on the Diocesan web site, and this despite the fact that Lavigne was a priest of the Diocese for over 25 years and is a convicted pedophile. And, as time marches on, this void in readily available information on the part of the Diocese of Springfield seems more and more like a plan.

The Catholic Observer (now the Catholic Mirror) is important because it purports to present the story of the Diocese in the form of news. The Observer has the same journalistic criteria of any respectable news organization. It also subscribes to the code of the Catholic Press Association (CPA), which states:

"This Code follows certain moral principles. Truth must be the cornerstone of all our work. Pursuit of the truth will lead to the Truth that is God. So telling the truth must be our first priority…any breach of this prime directive hurts ourselves and other people, sullies reputations, damages the credibility of our publishing institution and the Church."

A search for truth demands that we notice the local story that is not there, but should be, just as much as we notice the existing local stories about bake sales and 4th grade field trips. Just because a story is placed by church authorities, that does not mean it always rises to the level of news. It is not enough for the Observer to carry stories from the CNS (Catholic News Service, a creation of the USCCB) about "Milk Grottos" and pilgrimages. It is also not enough to print an unending stream of press releases from the Vatican. The Observer is called to a higher truth which involves sifting stories to be sure they are comprehensive, relevant and proportional.

Because the Catholic Observer has not lived up to these ideals, it is the subject of a formal complaint to the CPA. There are many signs of bias in the Observer's reporting, particularly that of staff writer Rev. Bill Pomerleau. The complaint alleges that the Observer's coverage of the $8.5 million settlement has been untrue.

For the last several years, the settlement has been the elephant in the pages of the Observer. Yet, it is almost never mentioned. And when it is mentioned, fact is intermixed with opinion.

I mention only one particularly egregious example, "Springfield Diocese Offers All Its Abuse Documents To Insurers" from the issue of Feb. 2, 2007. This article appeared shortly after the court order which effectively ended the attempt by the Diocese to shield 7,700 pages from discovery. It was an important turning point, but those looking for real news were disappointed.

Contrary to the headline, not only did the Diocese not offer the insurers' all of its abuse documents – it did the opposite. It continued to withhold most of the documents, in direct violation of the Jan. 3 court order.

This article is shot through with the legal points and arguments of Egan & Co. and is nothing more than an attempt to re-argue the case in print after the arguments had been found wanting on Jan. 3. In so doing the author and the editors displayed a shameful disregard for the truth.

The article states that "… He [Judge Agostini] is expected to rule on whether the second group of documents….should be given to the insurers…" without informing the reader that the judge had already ruled on the matter.

Readers of the Observer were entitled to learn what was going on in the trial without any tilting of the playing field toward either the insurers or the Diocese. Instead, the readers got a rehashing of the legal team's efforts to thwart the court order to produce documents. None of the documents ordered produced were found to be "privileged" by the court on Jan. 3, yet Egan, in the legal court, and the Observer, in the court of public opinion, clung to this position.

These acts of defiance in twisting the plain meaning of words is unworthy of any publication, especially one that purports to hold the Truth especially dear.

Throughout the three-year insurance trial, it is doubtful that a single letter to the editor, editorial, or commentary can be found on the trial issues. At least, none were found in a review. This is quite remarkable, considering the high stakes involved. It is as if this organ of communication has become paralyzed.
_____
2. The Diocesan law firm of Egan, Flanagan & Cohen should be replaced.

See Paper 77, pg. 5, Paper 86, pg. 4, 8.

It's clear from studying court papers that the Diocesan legal team was not up for the match. The Diocese lacked a plan and fought a stubborn rear-guard action, even though it was they who initiated the suit. The strategy appears to have been based on denial, and, as the judge noted, "sweeping statements" and "declaratory assertions" rather than facts.

But even assuming that the Diocese was outmatched, it's more difficult to understand why they were not prepared for the litigation.

For example, if the suit was filed in June, 2005, after almost a year of growing resistance on the part of the insurers, and if the discovery was ordered to conclude by Oct., 2006, why, over this nearly two-year span, was the Diocese unable to come up with a single document for the insurers? What could explain this extraordinary delay, other than the argument made by the insurers, namely, that the delay was a deliberate strategy?

It's odd that having provided 80,000 documents only a few years before, in what must have been a Herculean effort at locating, reviewing, copying, and collating, that the Diocese really had such a hard time producing the documents a second time. Diocesan lawyers consistently acted as if they were burdened with an sudden and overwhelming task (though, again, it was the Diocese who had initiated the suit). It strains credibility to the breaking point (mine, anyway) that they were unable to produce even one document before the Emergency Motion to Compel was filed.

The firm's defense of the so-called "privileged" papers, the core of the litigation, was hapless. The several prongs of defense were largely based on the Talbot case (Jesuits v. Mass.), but, in the end, practically all of the 7,700 secret papers had to be turned over, including such items as unpaid bills, an undated newspaper article and a FedEx airbill. Even the one clause of Talbot that won in the original case turned out to be a loser for the Diocese. See pg. 8 of Paper 89.
The legal team was even lectured by the appeals judge for completely missing arguments in their own favor. See the "anticipatory breach" argument cited by Judge Duffly in Paper 89. Pg. 4.

Egan's campaign to get Nixon Peabody thrown out was equally embarrassing. There proved to be only 2 attorneys that were members of the NAAD out of the 600 or so attorneys employed at Nixon Peabody. Egan couldn't even get the acronym of the organization right (as the judge wrote, the proper short form of the National Association of Attorneys of Dioceses is NAAD, not NADA).

If you try and find the NAAD on the internet, you will soon come to the conclusion that it is anything but a powerful organization poised to strike terror into the hearts of progressive Catholics. On the contrary, it hardly seems to exist at all. And nothing during the trial dispelled this impression.

The more we learn about the Nixon Peabody campaign, the weaker Egan's arguments appear. Neither lawyer had used the list serve for discussions of sexual abuse, one of the core issues that Egan complained of. Also, neither man had been at NAAD conferences to discuss the supposedly critical legal strategies about staving off liability claims from victims of sexual abuse.

All of this leads to the conclusion that the Nixon Peabody dismissal effort was designed mainly, if not solely, to frustrate and delay the forward movement of the case. Thus, far from Nixon Peabody "…holding our case hostage…" as Egan claimed, the reverse was true.

See the "Diocesan Playbook" chapter for other reasons why Egan, Flanagan & Cohen, the law firm for the Diocese since around 1950, should be replaced immediately.

and..............


1. The number one lesson of the settlement is that the purpose of the church, which is the salvation of souls, has been severely compromised by the conduct of Diocesan leaders during the $8.5 million settlement.

Chapter Seventeen: The Diocesan Playbook




"It would mean a great deal if [McDonnell] cleaned house. He needs to take the responsibility of showing he treats survivors who come forward as doing a service to the diocese and not as enemies." - Peter Pollard, March 10, 2004, member of SNAP (Survivors Network of those Abused by Priests).

_____

Bishop McDonnell has not exactly treated victims as enemies – but neither has he embraced them. Instead, he seems content to watch as the victims, their concerns now "settled", once again recede into a shadowy past.

For example, he has not responded to the non-monetary demands of the victims which Mr. Pollard presented in December, 2008. And, in the yearly review of important stories in the Catholic Observer, a story of some 3,000 words, the $8.5 million settlement rated only about 50 words – the same amount of space covering a supposed apparition of the Blessed Virgin Mary in a damaged window at Mercy Hospital.

Despite Mr. Pollard's hopes in 2004, a review of Bishop Timothy A. McDonnell's actions shows that he did not clean house. The same chancery officials that surrounded Dupre for his 9 years in office (Sniezyk, Liston) the same lay advisors (Schuman, Egan) and the same media crew (Dupont, Pomerleau) continued, and continue essentially unchanged today.

Observers of entrenched bureaucracy will recognize the phenomenon. Some governmental offices can be revisited after a span of five or ten years, only to find that the same people and thought processes are still at work.

And so, corporate life goes on, uninterrupted, in the offices on Elliot St. The chancery continues to be legalistic in intent, defensive in posture, and deadly serious in outlook. Hardball is the rule.
While the Catholic Observer is supposed to be a window on the doings of the people of the Diocese, it is hard to find a story that does not relate directly to the official running of the Diocese, and impossible to find one that does not portray administration in a favorable light.

Regarding the settlement, McDonnell has succeeded in turning the backlogged lawsuits of the Dupre era into slightly over 100 settlements – but these have come at considerable cost. The unreimbursed amount that the Diocese has spent to date is more than $5.5 million.

More important, the continuation of Dupre's legacy has contributed to a grave loss of trust. Many view the Diocese as a polluted vessel. In the next few posts, we examine the rules of the game in the Springfield Diocese, those that constitute the Diocesan Playbook.
_____

The Playbook has only one goal:

1. protect corporation sole.


In order to do this, the Diocese employs many tactics: we concentrate on four:


1. maintain position
2. make decisions by not making decisions
3. avoid responsibility
4. withhold information


We'll look at how these tactics have been used in the Dupre and McDonnell administrations.

But first, a word about the goal (protect corporation sole).

The "Springfield Diocese" is really two things. One is the canonical entity sanctioned by Rome in 1870. The other is the legal Diocese created by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in 1898. We donate money and property to the legal Diocese and trust them to use it for the goals of the canonical Diocese.

The canonical Diocese is the one that includes all parishioners and clergy as the People of God, organized into a "particular church". It guides our faith, provides solace for the human condition, and challenges us to find a place for redemptive suffering in our lives. The canonical Diocese is part of the communion of saints on earth. It is one with, and sustained by, Jesus Christ.

The legal Diocese is known as corporation sole. It is no exaggeration and not a sign of disrespect to address the Most Reverend Timothy A. McDonnell as the CEO of the corporation known as the Diocese of Springfield.

Though they have the same name, these two "Dioceses" are quite different. Even the standard reference work used by the USCCB, the "New Commentary on Canon Law", has grave reservations about how compatible "corporation sole" is with canon law.

Sometimes, the bishop's motivations for action stem clearly from the canonical side; other times, his deeds are just as clearly meant to enforce a business decision. Sometimes, it can be interpreted either way. I suspect that bishops like this ambiguity.

It should be clear that in this section we refer mainly to the business decisions of the Diocese, shown by their actions over the last twenty years or so. In my opinion, it is the Bishops' desire to protect and preserve corporation sole, at all costs, which has led to most of the tactics described here. All of the tactics are legal, but many are questionable on moral grounds. The tactics were largely instituted by Dupre, and have been carried forward, in a slightly different style, by McDonnell.

An interesting aspect of the $8.5 million litigation is that part of our attorney's argument in Paper 50 was that the Springfield Diocese was essentially canonical rather than civil. He described it as part of a larger unit, sort of like a franchise of a McDonald's. Mr. Egan also tried to extend the "specialness" of Dioceses to the association of attorneys that represent them. He argued that an adverse decision in Springfield would affect the legal prospects of all other U.S. dioceses. It's clear that he was trying to apply canonical reasoning as a way to avoid civil responsibility.

This was rejected by the judge. He ruled instead that the Springfield Diocese was a stand-alone corporation, responsible for its own actions.

He said that the Springfield Diocese had the same duty toward its employees (its priests) as any other corporation. The Springfield Diocese was not excused from normal obligations, even though in the canonical sense it does have a "special quality" that other corporations lack. This is but one illustration that the civil Diocese and the canonical one can be, at times, very far apart.

_____

When the first misconduct commissions were formed in the early 90's, the Times suggested that "…such a board might still leave final decisions to the cardinal, but it would report directly to him and not through the church bureaucracy." But soon, the commission in Springfield was doing this very thing, if by "bureaucracy" we include the chancery's legal department. This became especially clear during the toxic buildup of cases during 2002.

We've seen that it was the legal opinions of John Egan and others that caused the commission to begin refusing complaints if the victims had already filed suit. Increasingly, commission hearings took on the appearance of an armed camp. By fall of 2002 the new emphasis on litigation was spilling over into the Hampden County legal system.

Throughout 2003 Dupre attempted to throw suits out of court in many ways. His justification was that: "… we should not throw away our defenses, especially, those based on the First Amendment and the laws of Massachusetts…".

Clearly, by fighting the victims, he felt that he was living up to his role as head of the Diocese. What is not clear is whether he was acting on behalf of the corporate Diocese, or of the canonical Diocese. But whatever his motivations, his actions showed that he did not see the self-interest of the victims and the Diocese as compatible. Just as clearly, he was dead set against allowing the victims their day in court.

Then, he resigned.

At first, Bishop Timothy A. McDonnell was greeted as something of a savior. Within days of his appointment in March of 2004, he met with representatives of victims and seemed eager to solve the backlog of cases. With him came a significant change in personal style.

Dupre was a hometown boy made good. Though initially forced into the religious life, he grew to accept it. Dupre seemed destined to wear black, and had a gaunt, funereal aspect to him. His persona was that of a combative canon lawyer.

McDonnell, raised in the hothouse world of New York politics, looked larger than life compared to Dupre, with many more tools at his command. He charmed many during his initial appearances in Springfield, joking in a self-deprecating way that he was worried about getting lost on the road – that he might confuse North Adams with Northampton.

Yet, it's important to remember that during the transition period, McDonnell was under enormous pressure to solve the Diocesan crisis on both the canonical and legal levels.

In April, 2004, McDonnell announced that he wanted to disassociate the Diocese from a $100,000 fund set up by Dupre the previous Fall, funded by anonymous donors to aid indigent, defrocked priests, a fund that newly-defrocked Richard Lavigne would qualify for on May 1. However, a month later, the fund was still in place.

This delay led to public criticism by Rev. James Scahill. He urged the Bishop to dissolve the fund or put it outside Diocesan control. It has since become clear that Scahill had already criticized McDonnell about the fund in private, probably during meetings of the Presbyteral Council. Scahill was a member of this group of 18 elected priests who helped govern the Diocese.

The new Bishop blew up and retaliated. He stated at a council meeting that Scahill had done as much damage to the Diocese as Lavigne. He fired Scahill from the council. When word got out of the comparison of Scahill to a convicted pedophile, victims and parishioners were outraged. The bishop was soon forced to apologize.

Yet, he insisted in his apology that "The Presbyteral Council is meant to be an advisory group to the bishop, not an adversarial one." He characterized Scahill's statements as "personal attacks."

Apparently, Scahill's greatest offense was that he took his criticism public. McDonnell said that "…the public second-guessing of my motives has slowed the [healing] process and, in some cases, may have derailed it…" He did not explain how Scahill's statements had slowed progress.

He also said: "While we can disagree on the arguments, there is no way that an attack by a priest on his bishop does not have consequences…you don't do that and not have repercussions."

This rather blunt display of the command hierarchy would not be repeated. Ever since, McDonnell has taken a different tack. His public statements about abuse are few, invariably kind, and are reflective in tone, even somewhat naïve.

And yet, at the same time, the Diocesan newspaper, of which he is publisher, has on several occasions editorialized on the shortcomings of SNAP (Survivors Network of those Abused by Priests). One example, published at the time of the $8.5 million settlement, is here, in which the group is tarred as an "attorney-allied group". Another, a reaction to the Burlington damage awards, is here.

It's difficult to gauge McDonnell's motivations, partly because he avoids speaking publicly about controversial topics. A notable example was on July 2, when the $8.5 million settlement was announced. He was out of town and not available for questions or additional comments during that watershed event.

One might describe McDonnell's approach to governance as "passive-aggressive". He asked parishioners to speak out about parish reconfiguration – but then restricted the "listening session" participants to a selected few. He mandates councils for every parish – but then does not work with them, even when critical decisions are made. He expresses solidarity with victims – but then finds time to criticize SNAP and other victim's organizations.

In a memorable exchange in April of 2008, the mother of two young boys filed a lawsuit against the Rev. Aaron Cote. Cote was not a priest of the Diocese, but the alleged crimes took place in the Springfield area, and Cote had been assigned here in the past. SNAP held a press conference outside 65 Elliot St., pressing McDonnell for more outreach to victims through the Observer, parish bulletins or the Diocesan web site.

The only response from McDonnell was that he knew little about the family or their accusations. "They are talking about it but they are not sharing," McDonnell said of the Survivor's Network. "That's what makes it difficult."

Another recent example was when William Nash, a native of the Springfield Diocese, showed up at Elliot St. to ask for help in defrocking a known sex offender, the Rev. James Tully. Instead, in the words of a local priest, Nash was "…condemned and chastised…" by McDonnell, simply because Tully was not a Diocesan priest. This super-sensitivity to criticism, such that the appearance of propriety seems more important than the pursuit of justice, raises questions about McDonnell's priorities.

One of the positive differences between Dupre and McDonnell is that while Dupre made it clear that pursuing laicization for troubled priests was the last thing on his mind, McDonnell has not opposed it.

In Dec. of 2002, it was reported that Dupre was not seeking laicization for Rev. Koonz, Kennedy, Meehan, Graves, and Dube. Yet in 2006, when Meehan was laicized, we learned from the Republican that another "6 or 7" were also candidates. Indeed, later that year Edward Kennedy and Alfred Graves were defrocked, joining Meehan, Lavigne and Malboeuf. The Diocese has not explained why its web site or print media carries no information about defrocked priests, and why only cursory announcements are made. It's also not clear where the pressure is coming from to continue the defrocking program – from McDonnell, the U.S. bishops, or the Vatican.

The defrocking initiative is important because it generates a great deal of paperwork between the Vatican and Elliot St. This helps to explain why the insurance lawyers were so eager to see the cache of secret chancery papers during the recent $8.5 million settlement.

Other than questions of style, there's been a remarkable continuity between the policies of the two bishops, as reflected in the tactics which we now turn to.

The first point of continuity between the two administrations is the Diocesan law firm of Egan, Flanagan & Cohen. This law firm has been in place for over 50 years, spanning back to the Weldon administration. From all appearances, the legal strategy of John Egan, lead counsel, and the legal strategy of the Diocese are one and the same. Whoever has been calling the shots, the legal strategy of the Diocese has been highly questionable, because it has placed secrecy before justice.

Whatever the meaning of the dollar amounts of the settlements, which, if anything, are on the low side, the moral costs have been high.

We now move from the macro-level of the Playbook to how it's been used in both administrations. Many of these tactics overlap. But, they all contribute to a solitary goal – the protection of corporation sole.

Playbook Tactics:

1. maintain position
(we're broke; we're special; it's someone else's fault)

2. avoid decisions
(make decisions by not making decisions; stall; litigate)

3. avoid responsibility
(hide power; create layers to diffuse accountability)

4. withhold information
never admit guilt; never give up defenses; maintain secrecy)

_____

1. maintain position
(we're broke; we're special; it's someone else's fault)



The Diocese has a peculiar position, not easily maintained. It acts as if it's broke – and at the same time pretends it's rolling in money. This contradiction is hard to explain. Perhaps they think that half the Catholic population expects them to be dependent on the Widow's Mite, while the other half expects them to invest as wisely as other corporations. Whatever the reason, the financial facts are cloudy.

Yearly operating budgets show in-and-out cash movement, but are never supplemented by a net worth or balance sheet, something every household is familiar with.

In a press release announcing his decision to sue the insurance carriers, McDonnell stated that "…the resolution of these issues is necessary so that the Diocese can resolve outstanding, legitimate claims…" This ploy of making the pending claims dependent on the reimbursement for the settled claims was sharply criticized by attorneys for the victims, to no avail.

Although McDonnell insisted on other occasions that the well was dry, this appears not to be the case. In a Republican story from November 15, a portfolio of more than $30 million was referenced. It is hard to see how the Diocese was prevented from using this money to satisfy the claims that McDonnell says he wanted to honor.

When victims from the second phase complained to McDonnell that their average award of $76,000 compared unfavorably to the average award of $168,478 of the first phase, the response was not sympathetic. The Diocesan statement was that "our hands are tied" because the insurers only gave a certain amount. This defense ignores that Travelers and Aetna and the other insurance companies were not the ones who were responsible for the priests during the time of the alleged crimes.

The "we're special" argument pops up any time that the employer/employee relationship of bishop and priest is questioned.

In the Dupre era, in April of '03, Egan argued before Judge Wernick that "…in Catholic belief, the relationship of a priest to his bishop is different than that of an employee to a secular employer…". Over a dozen lawsuits were delayed by the argument.

The same point was recycled by Egan during the McDonnell era in Paper 73. He said the Diocese "…contends that its relationship with its priests is different than that of an ordinary employer. Priests are not ordinary employees. They are consecrated to the priesthood on a lifetime basis, absent the extraordinary step of laicization. The priests take vows in connection with their ordination. The relationship between the Bishop and the priests is a sacred one…"

In neither case did the argument hold water. In 2003 the Diocese was not able to throw the cases out, and in 2008 the judge found instead that the Diocese was subject to all the secular rules of law for an employee's behavior. The judge said that examination of documents about the bishop-priest relationship was proper, because it might lead to admissible evidence. Nor did examination of them infringe on church decision-making about the priest's employment.

In 2005 there was a fight over a new law that would have required churches to report yearly income. McDonnell claimed that the Diocese was "special" and needed to devote all its money to good works. Apparently, McDonnell doubted that filling out financial disclosure forms was a good work. He said that the burden of filing would cost the Diocese as much as $1 million dollars, because individual parishes would be required to file – though the bill's sponsor, Sen. Marion Walsh, said that only dioceses – not parishes – would be required to file the reports.

It was later learned that the $1 million figure was claimed by a lobbyist for the bishops group (the Massachusetts Catholic Conference). He made the claim during testimony about potential costs for the Boston archdiocese, not the Springfield Diocese.

McDonnell's position was that "…the bill is a violation of the First Amendment…" and he promised that if the bill was passed, the Diocese would join other churches in a lawsuit to prove that the new law was unconstitutional.

But, it was clear that the bill was about money and accountability – not religious belief. The purpose of the bill was the disclosure of financial information – a sensible requirement that other non-profits such as the Boy's Club, Girl's Club and Red Cross take for granted, and that donors appreciate.

The Diocese claimed that their "specialness" allowed them to criticize Representative Daniel Bosley in August of 2008. Bosley had suggested a moratorium to promote better decision-making about changes suggested for the Adams church community. The Diocese said that the First Amendment prohibited Bosley from commenting on church affairs. They said that he suggested "...a direct interference in a purely religious matter…". The Diocese did not explain how dialogue about administration of church property related to protected religious belief.

"It's someone else's fault".

The Springfield Diocese has a long enemies list, and keeps it updated. The "secular media" and other advocates of free speech are a favorite scapegoat. Letters to the editor, editorials, blogging, victim support groups, and even juries are blamed for church troubles.

The Diocesan annual report for 2006 noted that the "…staff of the Catholic Observer continues to produce a highly regarded and award-winning newspaper that serves to balance the many times sensational reporting on the Catholic Church found in the secular media..."

However "highly regarded and award-winning", the Observer may be in some quarters, it shows an unusual antipathy to free expression, even Catholic free expression. For example, throughout the three-year insurance trial, it is doubtful that a single letter to the editor commented on the trial issues. At least, none were found in a review. The only mention of the lay reform group "Voice of the Faithful" over the last few years was in an article gloating about the problems they've encountered.

An editorial in the Observer complained about the very existence of the internet. The writer admitted that "…the Internet has made it possible for Catholics to find reliable information about happenings in the church from a variety of sources…", but still concluded that "…we can't say it has made our job here at the Catholic Observer any easier…". Perhaps if the Observer communicated with parishioners by posting articles on their web site, it might help. Creating and publishing an email address for Bishop McDonnell might put him in touch, as well.

Sometimes, in finding fault, the Diocese switches horses. For example, in the Dupre era, the lawyers for the insurance company were allies. They worked on the same side of the table as the Diocese, and helped wear down the victims.

Then, about a year into the McDonnell era, the lawyers for the insurers broke ranks when they were sued. For the next three years, they were in opposition, across the table from Egan & Co.

Not surprisingly, once the insurers changed position, they became a target for Diocesan scorn. They were regularly blamed in the Observer for the leisurely pace of the three-year settlement trial, although if one took the trouble to look at the court papers, a different picture emerged. Study of the court papers shows that it was the Diocese that did most of the foot-dragging.

More proof that "it's someone else's fault" was provided in an interview with WAMC public radio in early 2009. The Diocese stated that since for the past 14 years there have been discussions about pastoral planning and church consolidations in the Berkshires that, "...clearly we have made our intentions well known…none of this should have been a surprise really to anyone who was paying attention all these years."

The implication is that if the disenfranchised parishioners of St. Stan's in Adams don't understand the decision to close their church, then they obviously weren't paying attention. Similarly, in recent months Msgr. Bonzagni, the official in charge of pastoral planning, defended the decision to close St. Stan's. He observed that if the participants in the "listening sessions" from St. Stan's did not use their time wisely, then that was not the fault of the Diocese.

In all of this we can see that the Diocese is not above blaming the victim in order to maintain position.

_____

2. avoid decisions
(make decisions by not making decisions; stall; litigate)



It's a peculiar trait of U.S. bishops that they would rather maintain the status quo and not make a decision than make a wrong one. This goes far in explaining how the sexual abuse crisis could have grown so large. The crisis required a creative and aggressive response from risk-taking chief executives, but instead was left to fester. Eugene Kennedy has explored this dynamic in his article for the National Catholic Reporter "The Great Inertia".

In Springfield, Dupre, the canon lawyer, was ideally suited to play the legal game of waiting it out – until the day that he himself ran out of time.

It was a point of pride for Dupre that his Diocese avoided trials. He said: "Although in other areas of our state, abuse cases have come to trial, none involving the Diocese of Springfield ever have. I hope to continue that record."

And he did. Even when lawsuits flooded the Diocese during 2003, where others saw a demoralizing situation, Dupre saw only "a complicated issue" and asserted that priests and laity were still "…standing with our head held high…". Springfield was the last of the four dioceses in the state to share lists of victims and accused priests with the local District Attorneys.

The stalling tactics of the Misconduct Commission started almost as soon as it was formed in Dec. of 1992. Many of the first complainants were dissatisfied with the commission's response. This led to the consolidation of cases under Attorney Wiggins, which led in turn to the 1993 settlement with 17 of Lavigne's victims.

As we've seen in previous posts, the commission kept a lid on cases by playing the "morality" card. First, the emphasis was shifted from justice and investigation to a vaguely defined "healing". The object of the commission's recommendations also shifted, from the accused to the accusers. Victims were told that retention of a lawyer could "complicate" things. They were asked to pray, forgive the priest, and move on.

These strategies deflected accountability while leaving church structure unaltered.

In the spring of 2002, a dead calm prevailed in the commission's docket. We've seen that by fall a victim's revolt was underway, resulting in a wave of lawsuits, many naming higher-ups for the first time. This assault prompted the Diocese to rely more and more on legal muscle.

And yet, at the same time, Dupre expressed distaste for legal scraps, and tried to distance the Diocese from them. For example, when he tried to throw out five suits based on charitable immunity, he called the move to dismiss the cases "…a legal maneuver, which [would] not interfere with financial compensation to all victims with legitimate claims." This rather remarkable statement doesn't take into account that the charitable immunity doctrine caps damage awards at $20,000 dollars.

Although Dupre never ceased claiming that his motivation in pushing for settlements was to give each case "the attention it deserves", he never explained why it was not possible for a victim's case to get the "attention it deserves" from a jury trial.

Nor did he give any hint why going to trial and clearing the name of the priests, assuming they were innocent, was never mentioned as an option. It seems not to have been on his radar. Apparently the self-interest of the Diocese and the accused priest did not always coincide.

In April, '03, the Diocese argued for dismissal of charges in the Dobbert case, one of those which named higher-ups on negligent supervision charges. The motion was clearly an attempt by the Diocese to insulate itself from the actions of its priests. Egan argued that the bishop's oversight of priests in his diocese is a matter of religious, not secular law.

When these lawsuits could not be thrown out or staved off, the result was the 2004 settlement, which had to be managed by McDonnell after Dupre's spectacular flameout. In retrospect, McDonnell's hand may have been forced because the Diocese had hit rock-bottom.

But, under his own steam, McDonnell has continued this tradition of stalling. He too, has worked so that no abuse claims have come to trial. His motto "healing on many levels", though certainly a graceful phrase, has meant in practice that over a hundred victims have forfeited forever their legal right to sue the Diocese. Confidentiality agreements of some 16 pages are still insisted on by the Diocese prior to any settlement, in violation of the reforms established by the Dallas Norms.

The final cost for the second wave ($4.5 million for 59 claims) now seems affordable, and maybe even a bargain, compared to other dioceses such as Burlington, in Vermont. There, $12.3 million was awarded last year to two individuals.

We said earlier that the self-interest of priest and diocese are not always the same, and that the Diocese has consistently avoided making decisions that would clear the name of clerics. A case in point is that of Rev. Karl Huller, who was accused after he died. Diocesan attorney Michael Callan admitted that clearing Huller's name was not an objective. "We are defending the diocese. Our concern is that the diocese didn't have knowledge of any abuse that may or may not have been committed," he said.

It is not generally known that the Diocese never pays for an accused priest's lawyer. "The Diocese has never represented any clergy accused of abuse. They have to retain their own counsel", said Michael McDonough, Jr., a member of Egan, Flanagan & Cohen.

Like Dupre, McDonnell has also preferred to settle. He does not fight suits targeting dead priests in order to clear their name. Neither does he encourage or allow the accused priests of the Diocese to fight suits, even when loud claims have been made that some of the accused priests are innocent.

Ironically, Dupre himself, the author of the strategy, has been thrown under the bus. He's become a non-person in the Diocese, an unmentionable man who does not appear on the web site, and who is not even prayed for during Sunday liturgies. The Diocese has done everything but airbrush his face out of group portraits.

On the legal fronts, McDonnell says that church accusations about Dupre have been "forwarded to the Vatican", and are no longer his responsibility. This avoidance may be canonically correct but the morality of it may still be questioned.

On the secular side, Dupre has retained two criminal defense lawyers, though it's not known who foots the bill. Perhaps we'll learn someday about how these decisions are made, but for now, the process remains well-hidden.

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3. avoid responsibility
(hide power; create layers to diffuse accountability)

When it came time for chancery bookkeepers to record the $7.7 million settlement in 2004, they faced a dilemma. The recording of it would wreck any existing account, yet it could hardly be left out of the annual report.

Putting a good face on the settlement must have presented a challenge. After all, the purpose of the deal was to protect the Diocese of Springfield by neutralizing lawsuits for sexual abuse. The settlement was nothing less than money for "priest protection" or even better "diocesan protection" but, it is not known if these names were seriously considered. What is clear is that the necessity to hide power and create layers asserted itself. The new account emerged in the next annual report as – Child Protection.

The new Child Protection budget of FY2004 included a sub-category: Civil and Canonical Fees. Though lawyers are not specifically mentioned , it's hard to see who else would be commanding these fees. The Diocese was certainly not being billed by the children. The total expenditure for Civil and Canonical Fees through FY2007 has been $894,892.

We've seen that the law was a refuge and a weapon for Dupre. Legal hairsplitting could be the path to a separation of the church's legal obligations from its moral ones. Indeed, the Diocese seemed willing to interpret the law to avoid oversight. In 2003, while trying to have a lawsuit dismissed, Mr. Egan explained that "…even if the Diocese acted irresponsibly in its assignment of priests, the law says that it cannot be held responsible for those actions."

The insurance lawyers, too, were practically an arm of the Diocese during the Dupre era. But, lawyers for the victims spoke up: "They are playing legal hardball and blaming it on the insurance companies," Attorney Stobierski said, after Diocesan lawyers asked for the dismissal of five suits after the bankruptcy of the Home Insurance Co.

The legal team of Egan, Flanagan & Cohen is only one layer of command that bishops employ to get the work done. Other prominent layers are communications (headed by Mark Dupont, assisted by Rev. Pomerleau), pastoral planning (headed by Msgr. Bonzagni), financial affairs (Mr. Schuman, recently retired, and Mr. LaBroad), to say nothing of the chancery offices of the Bishop's Cabinet, the educational sector, the cemeteries, and a host of ad hoc committees, all charged with carrying out the business of the corporation.

McDonnell has created a small army of ad hoc committees to help him govern. Many of these have recently dealt with the rearrangement and suppression of parishes. However, after the announcement is made that they've been formed, they're little heard from again.

It's been said that Weldon ran a tight ship, and that Marshall was no slouch either. It may well be that Dupre was just another in a long line of autocratic and isolated decision-makers who were surrounded by like-minded chancery officials. The Roman Catholic church is famous for such a top-down style.

Nevertheless, Dupre seems to have taken avoidance of personal responsibility to new lows. We cannot ignore that he's made no public statements confirming or denying the charges against him from three individuals.

Some public statements during his last two years in office suggest a man on auto-pilot, at times oblivious to the pain his words must have caused. He defended his decision to support Richard Lavigne by invoking Christian charity. He said that bishops are held to a higher standard and not allowed the "luxury" of a popular choice. His explanation implied that he had no choice in the matter.

This continues to be familiar language, because the Diocese often announces that it is "compelled" or "forced" to do things, when a secular understanding would be that they've made a choice to do this or that.

In Jan. '07, shortly after the judge's decision to compel the Diocese to release most of the 7,700 documents that were in dispute, attorney Stobierski commented that "…nearly every other diocese in the country has been able to negotiate these very same issues with their insurers…"

The explanation for the resistance by McDonnell shows a continuation of the Dupre philosophy. The reply was that "…the diocese felt it needed to be compelled by the court to disclose that information…"

Thus, we are supposed to believe that is the compulsion of the court that creates the Diocesan decision – an example of making a decision by not making a decision.

The Diocese sometimes uses legal arguments to advance its interests in unusual ways. One is the quixotic campaign to make lemonade out of the Dupre indictment. The claim advanced is that the investigation which resulted in two counts of child rape for Dupre was actually an exoneration of Diocesan bookkeeping practices.

This point is so important that Egan's explanation of it was included in the press release about the $8.5 million dollar settlement in July, and then repeated in the announcements of the settlement awards on Dec. 2. It's been a staple of Catholic Observer articles about the insurance trial.

Egan has regularly conflated the grand jury investigation of 2004, which looked at 80,000 documents, with the discovery portion of the settlement trial, which looked at about 60,000 – even though the two efforts are separated by several years and had different objectives.

While the grand jury chose not to indict Dupre on obstruction of justice or tampering charges, presumably for a lack of evidence that would hold up in court, there was no statement at the time from DA Bennett that he found Diocesan files to be pristine.

The grand jury was looking for evidence specific to Dupre, and while they found enough to indict on child rape, they did not find him personally responsible for the tampering charges. It's that simple. But, ever since, Egan sets up this straw man so that it can be knocked down.

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4. withhold information
(never admit guilt; never give up defenses; maintain secrecy)



Often, news stories about accused priests and victims have included a reference that information was released by the Diocese after an inquiry from the press. This has been so common that it raises a question – how much information has been put out by the Diocese in response to inquires without the acknowledgment?

Dupre was an expert at withholding information. For example, in Feb, '02, he confirmed in the Republican that Rev. Graves, Dube and Meehan had been removed from ministry years before – but this confirmation came only after an inquiry from the newspaper, and only after the newspaper had obtained those names from other sources.

During a lawsuit against Lavigne in Nov. of '02, Attorney Stobierski sought to examine Lavigne's file. Dupre authorized 168 pages to be released, out of a supposed total of 699 pages. Stobierski was not satisfied and sought a court order for the rest.

Six months later, the attorney was asking for 2000 more documents, which appears to be the true size of the file. This size difference was corroborated later during Rev. Scahill's testimony during a deposition.

The Diocese consistently argued in the Dupre era that the reason Lavigne's documents (and the documents of many other priests) could not be released was due to "confessor-priest" privilege.

It took until Jan. '07 of the McDonnell era before a judge ruled on this assertion. In Paper 77, Judge Agostini ruled that "…there is no support in the statute or the case law for the Diocese's sweeping assertion that any statement or acts…are covered by the privilege…" simply because one of the parties happens to be a priest.

It is an understatement to say that Dupre attempted to use all legal defenses. In 2003 the efforts to throw suits out of court seemed unending.

The Home Insurance Co. insolvency in July caused an immediate delay for five suits. Confessor-priest claims slowed the Lavigne cases, the Dobbert case was used as a test case for a dozen more under the Church/State argument, and the pre-1971 charitable immunity defense slowed five more.

It appears that the legal strategy during 2003 was hardball, pure and simple – litigate – and litigate some more. Or, as Dupre put it: "The issue is that we were willing to settle then and we are willing to settle now. But you have to get both sides to a reasonable spot." There is no way to know for sure, but, from all we know now, it is questionable whether Dupre would have ever stopped stalling, short of contempt of court.

We now know that confidentiality agreements were another prong of Dupre's approach. While settlements kept the costs down, it was confidentiality agreements within the settlement papers that kept court documents sealed.

An important case was the confidential settlement with Joseph Croteau, Danny's brother, in 1996. There is no way to be sure, but Joseph's settlement may explain why the 1993 settlement figure of 1.3 to 1.4 million had jumped to 1.7 million by the time a 2004 report on abuse was issued by the Diocese.

Even when the lawsuits and complaints kept rolling in, reaching a total of 65 or so by his resignation, Dupre felt no need to apologize for the alleged incidents. After all, they had not been proven.

In Dupre's view, there was only one type of information and one way of understanding things – the Diocesan way. And, there were no shades of gray. One senses that his confidence may have stemmed from a theological conviction that the canonical Diocese can never be wrong, morally, because of it's union with Christ. From that position, it is but a small step to the view that the Diocese (as corporation) cannot be wrong, either.

Dupre memorably referred to "the information" in the singular during an attempt to explain why it was that he and Rev. Scahill were so far apart. They differed in their recollections of what Dupre had said about the destruction of documents during a Presbyteral Council meeting.

In his explanation, Dupre said that he contradicted Scahill publicly because "…without prior notice to me or anyone in the diocese, the incorrect information was given by the priest [Scahill] to the local and Boston newspapers. So I felt the correction had to be equally public."

In the same statement he addressed the abuse charges: "…in a pastoral context, it does not matter who was legally responsible. What matters is, how can we bind up the wounds?"

Again we witness a conflict between canonical and civil. He asserts that his canonical responsibility for healing and pastoral care trumps all. Yet, his constant attempts to thwart and throw out suits and deny the civil rights of the victims suggest instead that he was willing to place the civil rights and needs of corporation sole well above those of the victims.

McDonnell has continued this strategy by restricting his public comments and instructing his lawyers and other confidants to keep Diocesan governance well-hidden. The decision about the so-called "privileged" documents which essentially ordered the Diocese to turn over the 7,700 pages they sought to keep private, is the best example. Even after a court order, the Diocese continued to insist on "privileges" that did not exist. In this attitude McDonnell is joined by the Most Rev. Roger Mahony, whose relentless stonewalling of similar documents is at the heart of the federal indictment underway in the Archdiocese of Los Angeles.

In Paper 77, Judge Agostini found that the Diocese had raised a religious autonomy-First Amendment argument about documents "…which are, on their face, not confidential…or which are devoid of substance…" He also wrote that "…privacy mandates by ecclesiastical authorities are not, standing alone, binding on this court."

In addition, the judge rejected arguments that a psychotherapist-patient privilege precluded disclosure. "The Diocese argues that where…the documents from and relating to the accused priests' treatment were placed in a confidential file accessible only to the bishop and his designees, the psychotherapist privilege applies and precludes their disclosure. This assertion is at odds with the statue and the case law."

Egan's immediate reaction in filing for a "protective order" to continue protecting the documents was labeled an "…impoundment dressed as a protective order…" when it was dismissed by the judge. The judge noted that not only the insurer's lawyers, but also the underlying claimants (victims) opposed the protective order.

Eventually, after they had exhausted all possible appeals and stalling tactics, Diocesan lawyers explained their motivation. They said that they felt they needed to be compelled by the courts in order to disclose the information. While this answer may be reasonable for a civil corporation, the same explanation, when applied to a canonical organization, makes a mockery of the transparency and openness that the Diocese claims to uphold.

The oddest thing about the battle over the so-called "privileged" papers is that the discovery went forward as planned, nearly all of the withheld documents were seen by the insurer's lawyers – and nobody died. None of the dire consequences predicted by Egan & Co. happened.

Dupre's brinkmanship was on display when he took the Fifth in connection with the civil charges levied against him in July of 2004. It's an unusual tactic because it must be disclosed in future litigation, and is usually considered to weaken the leverage of the defendant. Nevertheless, in a situation in which he could have answered the charges by affirming the facts, denying the facts, or remained silent, he chose the latter.

This same attitude of "taking the Fifth" seems to have permeated the Diocese during Dupre's tenure – he was tight-lipped about details of priestly misdeeds, regularly withholding important information from parishioners, the public and law enforcement officials.

The attitude has prevailed under McDonnell. He runs the Diocese with an iron hand, albeit while presenting a kinder face. The laity is not any more empowered now than it was under Dupre. McDonnell has mandated parish councils on paper, but then allows pastors to avoid setting them up. When they are set up, he avoids consulting them on important local decisions.

He insists that confidentiality agreements be part of the settlements (though the Dallas Norms supposedly put an end to this practice). He consistently has had "no comment" about Dupre, and maintained this silence even when the Dupre indictment was announced.

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The Diocesan Playbook, summary

Playbook Tactics:

1. maintain position
(we're broke; we're special; it's someone else's fault)

2. avoid decisions
(make decisions by not making decisions; stall; litigate)

3. avoid responsibility
(hide power; create layers to diffuse accountability)

4. withhold information
never admit guilt; never give up defenses; maintain secrecy)